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Abstract—This paper presents a possible solution to a fundamental 
limitation facing all blockchain-based systems; scalability. We 
propose a temporal “rolling” blockchain which solves the problem 
of its current exponential growth, instead replacing it with a 
constant fixed-size blockchain. We conduct a thorough analysis of 
related work and present a formal analysis of the new rolling 
blockchain, comparing the results to a traditional blockchain 
model to demonstrate that the deletion of data from the blockchain 
does not impact on the security of the proposed blockchain model 
before concluding our work and presenting future work to be 
conducted. 
Keywords: Cryptocurrencies, blockchain, peer-to-peer, 
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I.  INTRODUCTION  
The blockchain was first described by a developer using the 
pseudonym of Satoshi Nakamoto in 2008 in his paper describing 
the Bitcoin protocol [22]. The blockchain, originally 
implemented for the virtual cryptocurrency, Bitcoin, is a novel 
peer-to-peer approach which links a sequence of transactions or 
events together in a way that makes them immutable.  
Bitcoin is the most successful blockchain-based network; it has 
a market capitalization of over USD 8.5 billion and sees an 
average of 214,000 transactions being conducted on its network 
every day [5].  
The blockchain is a public ledger of all transactions that have 
ever been completed since the first “genesis” block. Each 
transaction from the Bitcoin protocol is broadcast to all nodes in 
the network which are maintaining the blockchain, known as 
miners. 
Blockchain-based networks have not properly addressed the 
issue of scalability; this causes the original decentralized nature 
of the blockchain to become increasingly centralized, as only the 
highest-resourced users are able participate in the network. This 
is because each node on the network is required to store the 
entire blockchain, which stores every transaction since its 
deployment. Consequently, low-resourced users – such as 
mobile users – are excluded from the network. 
To solve the issue of blockchain size that is facing not only 
the Bitcoin network, but all blockchain-based networks, we have 
created a new method, which can reduce the size of the Bitcoin 
blockchain from its current – and increasing – size of 71.8GB to 
a constant size of just 4.5GB. This new blockchain would remain 
this size irrespective of network size, or the length of time that 
the network has been deployed. As such, it not only reduces the 
cost of entry for low-resourced users, but also increases the 
network’s security, as the increased computational power 
donated by the additional low-resourced users would mean that 
the likelihood of a 51% attack would decrease and would cost 
more to conduct. 
Despite extensive development over many years and having 
demonstrated significant benefits, formal methods remain 
poorly accepted both by industrial practitioners and in academic 
research [15]. The aim of formal methods is to discover 
ambiguity, incompleteness, and inconsistency in protocols or 
software. They have been used to unearth real world security 
issues; with one such example being the use of the B language 
to discover a flaw in a major safety-critical system application 
concerning Line 14 of Paris Métro [18]. 
Formal methods allow the protocol to be expressed using 
unified notation, based on set theory and mathematical logic. 
This removes any ambiguity from the specification, and allows 
the formal specification to be refined to deployable code. Once 
a machine has been proven to be consistent and correct, these 
proofs should be valid in any context in which this machine is 
used as part of a more complex specification [3]. 
This paper conducts a formal analysis of the newly proposed 
temporal “rolling” blockchain using the B language. It will 
examine the security principles of the proposed model and 
conduct an in-depth analysis of the results, which will be 
compared to the security principles of traditional blockchain 
networks. Our aim is to demonstrate that our proposed model is 
a possible replacement to the traditional blockchain, and is 
capable of solving the scalability issue without introducing any 
additional security issues into the core data structure. 
The structure of this paper is as follows; first we examine 
related work conducted in the field of the blockchain and also 
formal methods. We then propose a solution to blockchain’s 
scalability problem – a temporal blockchain – and present the 
formal analysis of this new model using the B language, 
conducting an in-depth evaluation against the traditional 
blockchain models. We then propose future work for this area of 
research, before summarizing our findings and concluding the 
paper. 
II. RELATED WORK 
A. Formal Methods 
Formal methods aim to provide a method to prove that a 
specification is realizable, complete, consistent, unambiguous, 
and verifiable. Even the most complex systems can be modelled 
using relatively simple mathematical objects, such as sets, 
relations and functions, which form the basis of all formal 
languages [15]. 
Verifying the system allows a high degree of confidence to 
be placed in it, however this is highly debated by Hall, who 
argues that this statement is the biggest “myth” in formal 
specifications, and states that although all formal specifications 
involve a high degree of mathematical proofs, a formal 
specification can never be called “perfectly correct” however 
much you prove about the models [13].  
Knight et al. [15], Voros et al. [29], and Bicarregui et al. [3] 
all demonstrate real world examples where the implementation 
of formal methods resulted in significant bugs being found in the 
specification, such as on the Paris Métro Line 14 and at the 
Darlington Nuclear Facility. 
Z was the first formal language to be developed in academia, 
having been created in 1977 by J.R. Abrial [1] and later being 
further researched and developed by Oxford University. Lano 
[17] summarizes Z’s focus as being the formalization of 
requirements rather than the correct executable implementation 
of the specification. This summary is expanded on by Kaur et 
al., who explain that Z is a high level abstract model of the 
system requirements, which only provides a base to design and 
test the system [14], while Diller and Docherty add that there is 
no method to develop the abstract model into machine code [8]. 
The Z language formed the basis of the B language, which 
was developed to solve many of the fundamental issues and 
limitations of Z. It has been claimed that, at present, the B 
language is the most popular formal method to be used in 
industry projects [17]. 
As highlighted by Diller and Docherty [8], Smith describes 
how the B language is the first formal language to allow 
refinement – an incremental development process to develop the 
model – from an abstract specification to machine code (C++) 
[26].  
Leuschel and Butler further expand on the ability of the B 
language by describing two activities which no previous formal 
language has managed: consistency checking and refinement 
checking [19]. Consistency checking ensures the operations 
conducted by the machine do not invalidate the invariant, and 
the refinement checker ensures each machine is a valid 
refinement of a previous machine. 
B. Blockchain 
The blockchain was first described in a self-published 
research paper entitled “Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash 
System” written under the pseudonym of Satoshi Nakamoto. 
The blockchain is the underlying gossip protocol of all 
cryptocurrencies and is a novel peer-to-peer method that links a 
sequence of transactions or events together in a way that makes 
them immutable [22]. McConaghy et al. accurately describe the 
main characteristics of the blockchain as decentralized control, 
immutability, and creation and movement of digital assets [21], 
and the success of Bitcoin has been attributed solely to the 
blockchain [24]. 
Drainville describes how the blockchain is a collection of 
every transaction to have ever occurred on the Bitcoin network 
[9]. On creating a transaction, a user broadcasts this to all peers 
in the network. Kroll et al. expand on this, explaining how a 
select group of peers, called miners, collect broadcast 
transactions and attempt to gather them in a block that satisfies 
a cryptographic hash function [16]. The block must contain a 
cryptographic hash of the previous block; this is the method used 
to cryptographically link every block in the blockchain to its 
previous block, all the way back to the first or “genesis” block. 
Producing a block is both computationally intensive and 
probabilistic. Given a proposed block, each miner has a fixed 
and independent probability of successfully producing a block 
which satisfies the hash function for each unit of computation 
time. Whilst it is difficult to produce a block, it is not difficult to 
verify a correct block. 
Kroll et al. [16] explain that the mining process requires vast 
computing power as only a “brute force, trial and error” method 
can be used to calculate the SHA-256 hash. Every two weeks, 
the complexity of the challenge is adjusted to ensure that, on 
average, a block is mined every 10 minutes. The financial 
incentive of 25 bitcoins (USD 14,419.50 [7]) is offered to the 
first miner to successfully calculate the hash. Barber et al. [2] 
argue that it is this financial reward that ensures the majority of 
the miners on the network act honestly and obey the network 
protocol.  
Sompolinsky and Zohar argue that only an attacker 
controlling more than 51% of the network hashing power would 
have the ability to change past transactions [27], and 
demonstrate that the cost of resources required to control 51% 
would outweigh the potential rewards. Dumas et al. [10] 
question the 51% vulnerability claim, which was originally 
presented in Nakamoto’s whitepaper [22], suggesting that it is a 
wide-spread security claim, but no analysis has been conducted 
to prove or disprove this assumption.  
Vulnerability to attacks is not the blockchain’s only issue. 
Poon and Dryja summarize the scalability problem facing all 
blockchain-based networks as not being a single problem, but 
rather the combination of multiple issues that ultimately affect 
the possible scalability of the blockchain [25]. Poon and Dryja 
[25] reinforce their scalability argument by demonstrating how 
the maximum theoretical number of transactions per second that 
Bitcoin’s blockchain is able to process is 7, whereas VISA can 
process 20,000. McConaghy et al. [21] agree with Poon and 
Dryja and demonstrate that the Bitcoin’s blockchain is currently 
50GB – having grown by 24GB in 2015 – and also prove that in 
order to achieve the transaction rate of VISA by only increasing 
the block size, the blockchain would need to grow by 3.9 GB/day 
or 1.42 TB/year.  
Overall, the blockchain is arguably the most important 
invention of the original Bitcoin whitepaper. While it has seen 
impressive growth and now handles an average of 239,138 
transactions per day [6], it is not a faultless system. Having been 
shown to be vulnerable to attacks, such as the 51% attack, and 
faced with scalability issues which impact on the potential 
growth, there is plenty of room for further research to solve these 
issues. 
III. ROLLING BLOCKCHAIN OVERVIEW 
With the increase in adaptation of blockchain-based 
networks, such as Bitcoin, the fundamental limitations of all 
blockchain-based networks are now being realized. Currently, a 
major limitation of the adaptation of blockchain-based networks 
is the amount of resources – specifically the hard drive space 
required to store the blockchain – that a user must donate to the 
network in order to participate in it.  
Bitcoin’s blockchain is currently 71.8GB in size and is 
increasing at a rate of 1,008MB every 7 days [4]. The peer-to-
peer nature of the blockchain means that each client on the 
network is required to download, store, and keep the complete 
blockchain up-to-date.  
Low-resourced users, for example users on mobile devices, 
can no longer become a full node as they are required to 
download the complete blockchain. Although a mobile user can 
participate in the network, for example to make a transaction, 
they do not contribute any resources to the network. 
Low-resourced users will increase as the blockchain 
networks increase in size. If a blockchain-based network were to 
go mainstream, it would be unreasonable to ask each home user 
to donate hundreds of gigabytes of their hard drive just to 
participate in the network. Consequently, the size of the 
blockchain is a key barrier in the mass adaptation of a 
blockchain-based network that aims to move beyond the 
hobbyist users which currently use the network. 
Users are clearly unwilling to be a full node, as evidenced by 
the formation of “mining pools”. A mining pool is a collection 
of nodes which group together and pool their resources to 
increase the probability of solving a block’s proof of work. Here, 
the nodes participating in the network do not need to download 
the blockchain, and instead just donate hashing power to the 
pool. Although this method has many advantages for the nodes, 
such as less resources being required in order to participate in 
the network, it leads to centralization of the network. As an 
example, the mining pool GHASH.IO controlled over 50% of 
the Bitcoin network, controlling 55% of the network from 12 
June 2014 until 13 June 2014 [20]. 
Excluding low-resourced users, such as casual home users 
and mobile users, also has a detrimental impact on the security 
of the blockchain. With lower-resourced users being able to 
participate in the network as a full node, the donation of the CPU 
power would increase the total amount of hashing power held by 
the network. As a result, more resources would be required to 
conduct a 51% attack and the attack would be less likely to 
succeed. This clearly shows that the exclusion of low-resourced 
users cannot be taken lightly, and every effort should be made to 
enable users of all levels to participate in the network. 
Blockchain technology has applications beyond virtual 
currency and, with research into temporary, distributed data 
storage and reputation systems on the blockchain already being 
conducted, it is evident that the blockchain no longer needs to 
store all data since the creation of the network. The need for a 
deleting blockchain can be further evidenced by EU Directive 
95/46/EC, which provides “the right to be forgotten” [23]. 
Reducing the blockchain is currently possible using the 
pruning method. This involves downloading the entire 
blockchain and the client then manually searching through the 
blockchain to remove any “spent transactions”. However, this 
method requires the user to be able to first download the entire 
blockchain. Mobile users cannot do this due to storage 
limitations, and this problem will only increase as the network 
grows. There is no global consensus on what is the smallest 
required blockchain and, while the blockchain can currently be 
reduced by 35% using the pruning functionality of the Bitcoin 
client [12], this is still far from ideal. This method also focuses 
on transaction-based blockchain systems, and does not take into 
account storage-based blockchains where, after a set period of 
time, the stored data becomes obsolete.  
 We propose an innovative new method of solving the 
scalability issue, a rolling blockchain. In this blockchain, only 
data stored for a pre-set period will be included in the 
blockchain; any data older than this period is removed 
automatically. 
The rolling blockchain implements fully decentralized and 
trustless checkpoints on a blockchain network, and thus created 
a self-deleting and self-managing blockchain.  
Unlike previous solutions to the scalability issue, miners are 
not required to download the entire consensus, and delete “spent 
blocks” manually. A spent block is a block which has no 
transactions that can be used as an input in a new block, and 
currently the only method to remove these from the locally 
stored blockchain is to manually search the blockchain for such 
blocks and remove them from the local blockchain. Our solution 
aims to be globally accepted, and will no longer require any node 
to store the blockchain history from the first “genesis” block.  
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At a set point every day, our method requires the miners who 
are mining the current block to add a checkpoint to this block, in 
which all blocks older than 30 days can be safely removed.  
Since this occurs every 24 hours, only 24 hours of data (144MB) 
would be removed each day. This calculation is based on a 1MB 
block being mined every 10 minutes – as is the configuration on 
current blockchain-based networks. 
In the example of a reputation system, to prevent a user and 
their score from being deleted in the event that they have not 
gained any reputation in the past thirty days, upon each deletion, 
the network would be able to populate a special “history” section 
of the block, which would average the user’s reputation score 
from the data and add it to this section, thus ensuring that no user 
is ever forgotten.  
Our proposed rolling method would not be a separate action 
or require any additional resources; instead, it would be merged 
with the mining process for a new block at a set point daily, for 
example at midnight GMT. This method allows for a consistent 
size blockchain that would be significantly smaller than the 
current generation of blockchains.  
Figure 1 shows the current Bitcoin blockchain size, both 
before and after pruning, as well as our proposed model, all 
modelled up to twenty years from the creation of the network, 
based on the assumption that the current network growth is 
maintained. 
 Figure 1 clearly demonstrates how a network with the 
rolling blockchain implemented would be able to include lower-
resourced users whereas, even with pruning enabled, the 
resources required for traditional blockchain-based networks 
would exclude all bar the most highly-resourced users. This will 
allow a rolling blockchain-based network to scale to a greater 
extent than a network using a traditional blockchain. 
Simulation of the rolling blockchain demonstrated that when 
the blockchain was kept at a constant size of 4.5GB, the amount 
of network traffic caused by nodes joining the network was 
reduced significantly – 50.34TB daily, based on the average of 
15.89% turnover of nodes on the network – as observed on the 
live Bitcoin network over a period of 30 days. 
The reduced network traffic would impact on the 
propagation of new transactions over the network, reducing the 
propagation delay. This issue is likely to become critical as the 
network grows and the block size increases. It also reduces the 
cost of entry to the network, as with the reduced network traffic 
and download being required, users in areas with slow and 
limited internet connections are able to participate, something 
which on current blockchain-based networks has to date not 
been possible. 
IV. OUR FORMAL ANALYSIS METHOD 
No previous formal analysis has been conducted on any 
blockchain-based networks. In the following sections we 
conduct the first formal analysis of a blockchain-based network 
and analyze whether our temporal “rolling” blockchain model 
adheres to the three guiding principles in information security of 
Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability [28].  
The adversary we model as attacking the network is an 
adversary with less than a majority of computing power on the 
network, and one who follows the protocol behavior correctly. 
Since formal requirements have never been defined for 
blockchain-based systems, we defined a set of requirements for 
each of the core principles in information security using assumed 
goals of the traditional blockchain-based system, although these 
were altered slightly for our temporal blockchain. 
• Confidentiality – Whether data contained within the 
blockchain can be copied, removed or falsely created 
by a defined type of attack. Will focus on ensuring the 
model of the temporal “rolling” blockchain is 
mathematically secure, and blocks cannot be 
duplicated. We do not consider attacks such as the 
client being compromised in our model. 
• Integrity – Once a block is confirmed and added to the 
blockchain, it cannot be modified or removed unless it 
is scheduled to be removed because of the “roll”. This 
is the section where we focus much of the research in 
this paper.  
• Availability – Ensure no authorized users are denied 
service. Due to the peer-to-peer nature and the fact that 
each node has a full copy of the blockchain, as long as 
a single node is online, the network would continue to 
function correctly. 
The modelling conducted in the B language will focus on the 
integrity property of the temporal blockchain. The specifications 
for the integrity property of the temporal blockchain are: 
• Data can only be inserted into the blockchain if valid 
(The data has a matching hash to the contents contained 
within the block – we assume the block contents are 
valid in this model). 
• A block must be unique and not a duplication of a 
previous block. 
• A block must have a unique identifier, as well as a 
cryptographic link to a previous valid block.  
• After a pre-defined time, (30 days) data will be 
removed from the blockchain. 
The models created for our experiments were all created 
using the B language and the ProB syntax. This language 
was chosen due to its ability to refine the model to a greater 
depth than alternative languages, and the fact that it allows 
accurate modelling of the complex data structure of the 
blockchain.  
An invariant is a condition on the state variables that must 
hold true permanently when the operations are run correctly and 
which adheres to the machine properties. 
We have defined the invariant I as: 
I == okay => P /\ not okay => not P 
Property “I” should always hold true, the invariant property 
is defined as “P”, and “okay” is a Boolean history variable, 
which does not influence the behavior but is true as long as no 
malicious actions have been carried out and false once a 
malicious operation has been performed. We consider the model 
to be correct if the invariant holds true after each operation is 
run. 
There are two main proof activities when using the B 
language, both of which we use during our experiments. The first 
is consistency checking, which shows all operations that are run 
preserve the invariant. The second is refinement checking, which 
is used to show a refinement machine model is a correct and 
valid refinement of a previous machine model. In addition, ProB 
also contains a temporal and a state-based model checker, both 
of which can be used to detect various errors in B specifications.  
The model gets checked using an exhaustive model checking 
tool, which restricts the sets to a small finite set and the integer 
variables to a small range, which allows the model checking tool 
to traverse all the reachable states of the machine to find any 
problems such as a violation of the invariant.  
In addition to this, the validation of a machine is ensured in 
ProB by conducting more than 1000 unit tests, monitoring pre- 
and post-conditions during run time, integration testing, as well 
as validating the parser. 
ProB validation tools are valid for use in the safety integrity 
level (SIL) 4 development process [18]. This is the most 
dependable of all the European functional safety standards [11], 
and ProB animation facilities give users the confidence that their 
specifications are correct and valid. 
A. Our experiments 
We modelled our temporal blockchain using the B language 
as can be seen in Figure 2. 
We opted for the roll to be conducted after 30 days, although 
this would be dependent on the application of the rolling 
blockchain and the requirements of the network. A comparison 
against the traditional blockchain security principles will be 
carried out after each operation to allow us to accurately evaluate 
if the temporal blockchain achieves the same security principles 
as the traditional blockchain. 
The invariant defined in Figure 2 sets out the rules which the 
model must follow to be considered correct; these were created 
based on the deployed blockchain system found in Bitcoin and 
the formal requirements described in section 3.  
We ensure each block must have a single block hash, and 
ensure that no two blocks can have the same block hash. This 
was achieved using partial injections in the invariant. This is an 
accurate model of the real world hash function, as a critical 
property of hash functions is that two different inputs must have 
different hashes.  
Partial injection functions were also used in the invariant to 
specify that each block can only have a single ID, which is a 
positive natural number. 
In this model, we achieve the cryptographic link, which in 
the deployed network links the blocks together, by linking the 
current block hash with that of the previous block using a partial 
injection function, ensuring only one link between blocks can 
exist.  
SETS  
USER; BLOCKS; BLOCK_HASH; PREVIOUS_HASH; 
RESPONSE = {Yes, No} 
 
VARIABLES  
accounts, transactions, 
cryptographic_link, confirmation, 
blockid, nextid 
 
INVARIANT  
accounts <: USER &  
confirmation : BLOCKS >+> BLOCK_HASH &  
cryptographic_link : BLOCK_HASH >+> 
PREVIOUS_HASH & transactions : accounts 
>+> BLOCKS & 
card(BLOCK_HASH) = card(PREVIOUS_HASH) &  
nextid :NATURAL1 &  
blockid : BLOCKS >+> NATURAL1 &  
card(cryptographic_link) < 31 &  
card(confirmation) < 31 & 
card(confirmation) = card (blockid)  
 
INITIALISATION  
accounts, transactions, 
cryptographic_link, confirmation, 
blockid, nextid := {},{}, {},{},{},1 
 
OPERATIONS 
add_block(b, bh, ph) = 
PRE  
b : BLOCKS &  
bh : BLOCK_HASH &  
b |-> bh /: confirmation &  
ph : PREVIOUS_HASH & bh |-> ph /: 
cryptographic_link  
THEN  
confirmation := confirmation \/ {b |-> 
bh}|| 
cryptographic_link(bh) := ph ||  
blockid(b) := nextid; 
nextid := succ(nextid) 
END; 
 
conduct_roll(b,bh,ph)= 
PRE  
b |-> bh : confirmation &  
bh |-> ph : cryptographic_link &  
card(confirmation) = 30  
THEN  
confirmation := {b} <<| confirmation ||  
cryptographic_link := {bh} <<| 
cryptographic_link 
END; 
 
 
Figure 2:  Temporal blockchain in B   
The add_block function in the model achieves the 
specification requirement that only valid data (which we model 
as a block) can be inserted only if b (the block to be inserted) is 
an element of the set block, where we assume the set block 
contains only valid possible blocks. The same method has been 
used to ensure a correct and valid block hash has been calculated. 
To achieve the requirement of ensuring a replay attack is not 
possible, the prerequisites check that the block attempting to be 
added has not previously been included. To do this it ensures 
there is not an existing relationship between the block data and 
the block hash. 
The prerequisites for the add_block operation mimic the real 
world system where each miner would check that the block 
contains valid data and the correct block hash as well as ensuring 
the block has not previously been included in the blockchain 
before attempting to include this block in the blockchain. 
The conduct_roll operation ensures the block to be deleted is 
the correct block, preventing any pre-emptive deletion of a block 
as can be seen in the prerequisites for the operations. The 
prerequisites ensure the block to be deleted is the correct block 
in the chain, and the block has previously been confirmed in the 
blockchain.  
 The operation then removes the block and cryptographic 
link from the blockchain, thus ensuring the invariant never 
becomes invalidated, unlike in the original model when a block 
was deleted. 
The experiments conducted were rigorously tested, all 
validation was conducted using the ProB validation tool, testing 
1000 possible use cases to ensure the safety integrity level 4 
properties for validation of the machine were achieved. The 
operations were replicated 1000 times to ensure the accuracy and 
reliability of the results. To ensure consistency with the results 
all operations where conducted on the same machine with the 
same amount of resources provided to them.  
The model’s invariant held true for all of the use cases used 
to test its validity. At no point did any of the operations invoke 
an invalid state of the invariant, proving that our model of the 
blockchain, after completion of the operations, never put the 
invariant into an invalid state, thus proving that our model of the 
temporal blockchain is mathematically correct.  
It also shows that it is possible to implement a rolling 
blockchain and disproves the many criticisms that there is no 
solution to the scalability issue and that it is impossible to delete 
data contained within a blockchain. However, this result does 
not show whether the rolling blockchain is able to maintain 
integrity of data contained within the blockchain when an 
adversary is attacking the blockchain.  
The operations demonstrated in the rest of this paper attempt 
to subvert the main protocol of the temporal rolling blockchain 
to invalidate the formal specifications.  
Figure 3 shows a pre-emptive deletion of a data block before 
the applicable time to delete blocks. The operation attempts to 
delete a block at a random point in the blockchain. This would 
mimic an attacker attempting to remove a block of data before 
the correct period. 
This operation was a naïve attempt to remove the block from 
the blockchain, where an attacker simply tried to remove the 
block without considering the cryptographic links between the 
previous and next blocks. Due to the method of block deletion, 
during the testing of this operation, it was shown that this 
operation invalidated the invariant. This result was confirmed 
during the use case validation testing, where this operation 
caused the invariant to fail 100% of the time.  
However, an improved method of attack would be remove 
the cryptographic link between the previous and following 
block. An operation to test this theory was implemented and 
evaluated and, perhaps surprisingly, this method kept the state 
machine valid at all times, and passed all 1000 use cases. On the 
surface, this shows that the blockchain is susceptible to this 
attack, however for this attack to be successfully conducted on a 
live deployed network, the attacker would require over half of 
the total hashing power of the network, which is beyond the 
attacker model used in this paper 
This result demonstrates that linking together with the hash 
of the previous block, as per Bitcoin’s blockchain, is effective 
against this attack and, since the attack was before the correct 
deletion point, the attack failed. This shows that integrity of data 
against deletion is achieved in this system and, when compared 
with the results obtained during the integrity against deletion test 
conducted on the traditional blockchain, it shows that the 
temporal rolling blockchain offers the same integrity against 
deletion of data as the traditional blockchain; this is critical if 
this model is to be considered a viable solution to the scalability 
issue currently faced by all blockchain-based networks. 
Preventing the duplication of data is another important 
requirement that needs to be met. This task is made harder in the 
rolling blockchain since blocks can be deleted, so unlike the 
traditional blockchain it is no longer as simple as searching the 
blockchain to see whether the block has been included before. 
To prevent repetition, each block is given a unique identifier, and 
requires all the data to be valid before it is entered into the block, 
which prevents this attack. As such, the temporal rolling 
blockchain maintains the integrity and authenticity of data.  
B. Summary of the experiments conducted on our formal 
model of the temporal rolling blockchain 
 
The temporal blockchain proposed in this paper reduces the 
resources required to be donated to network by the nodes 
participating in the network, reducing the scalability issue 
currently facing all traditional blockchain-based networks. 
Before the temporal blockchain can be further developed to 
be considered a serious replacement of the traditional 
blockchain, it was vital that the security properties of the 
data_deletion(b) = 
PRE  
b : BLOCKS 
THEN  
confirmation := {b} <<| confirmation  
END; 
Figure 3: operation attempting pre-emptive deletion of a data block   
temporal blockchain were evaluated and compared to those of 
the traditional blockchain model. 
We created a formal model of the temporal blockchain, 
focusing on the integrity of the data contained within it, as shown 
in the previous section. The operations conducted on the formal 
model attempted to subvert the protocol into adding invalid data 
to the blockchain. 
The results obtained from the operations conducted on the 
formal model demonstrate that the temporal blockchain is a 
suitable replacement for the traditional blockchain model, and 
achieved all the formal requirements. 
In the traditional blockchain model, data duplication is 
impossible, and data modification is also impossible unless an 
attacker controls a majority of the network, and the difficulty of 
conducting a 51% attack grows exponentially the further in the 
past the block requiring modification is. The traditional model 
also requires a block to only be inserted if the block has the 
correct hash for the block, is cryptographically linked to a 
previous block, and contains valid data. These are the criteria our 
proposed model must fulfil if it is to be considered successful. 
The operations conducted on the formal model show the 
temporal blockchain achieves all the same principles as the 
traditional blockchain.  
The temporal blockchain demonstrated with the add_block 
operation that only valid block data with the correct block hash 
and the correct cryptographic link could be added to the 
blockchain. This operation was tested with incorrect data, and 
1000 use cases were run to ensure that this operation did not add 
any incorrect data on to the blockchain, which it did not. This 
shows that this operation behaves in the same way as a 
traditional blockchain model would, and shows the temporal 
model prevents invalid data and duplicate data from being added 
to the temporal blockchain.  
The requirement of no data modification occurring within 
the temporal blockchain, and thus the assurance of complete data 
integrity, was also challenged in our model via two data_deletion 
operations, a naïve operation and a more complex operation. The 
naïve operation, which simply tried to remove the block, resulted 
in the invariant becoming invalid when the operation was ran. 
The more complex operation, meanwhile, attempted to change 
the cryptographic link, and was successful. This however does 
not mean that our protocol is weaker than the traditional 
blockchain models. To conduct this attack on a live network, an 
attacker would need a majority of the hashing power on the 
network; our adversary model focuses on the attacker having 
less control than this, and also this result is the same as if an 
attacker would have conducted this on the traditional blockchain 
network with 51% of the network hash. To reinforce this claim, 
a model of the traditional blockchain was created and this same 
operation was run; the results obtained showed that both the 
temporal and traditional blockchain provide the same level of 
protection against an attacker trying to remove a valid block 
from the blockchain. 
This result demonstrates that the temporal blockchain, which 
enables data to be deleted at a specific point in time, does not 
allow blocks to be deleted pre-emptively – an important feature 
if this blockchain is to replace the traditional blockchain.  
These results show that the added function of deletion of data 
from the blockchain at a pre-determined time does not add any 
additional vulnerabilities to the structure of the blockchain and 
the temporal model achieves the same security principles as the 
traditional blockchain that is currently implemented in Bitcoin. 
Overall, the temporal blockchain is able to solve the 
scalability issue of storage-based blockchain systems, which 
currently affects reputation systems implemented on the 
blockchain, while maintaining the core security principles held 
by the traditional blockchain model.  
V. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we propose and create an improved blockchain, 
the temporal blockchain, and set out core formal requirements 
which were then modelled using the B language. Several 
experiments were conducted to test whether periodically 
deleting data from the blockchain would affect the security 
properties of the rolling blockchain, and to see whether the 
underlying model is able to be subverted by an attacker. Through 
the modeling of the temporal blockchain, we conducted several 
operations which tested the security principles of the temporal 
blockchain, with a focus on the integrity of the data contained 
within the blockchain. We were then able to compare these 
results with those of the traditional blockchain model.  
The results of our experiments confirmed that the temporal 
rolling blockchain maintains the key security principles and 
provides the same security properties as the traditional 
blockchain, and does not introduce any additional 
vulnerabilities. 
Our results suggest that the rolling blockchain is a viable 
alternative to the traditional blockchain, as it maintains the core 
security principles – especially data integrity – and is as secure 
against data manipulation and attack as the traditional 
blockchain. In addition, it solves key fundamental issues, such 
as the scalability of the blockchain, and enables low-resourced 
users to be included in the network. 
Overall, this paper aimed to propose a solution to the 
problems faced by the traditional blockchain.  This solution is 
the rolling blockchain, which we have shown to be able to 
maintain the same security properties as the traditional 
blockchain. However, this is just the foundation of this idea and 
there is scope for a lot more research to be conducted in various 
areas to ensure the rolling blockchain is capable of replacing all 
blockchain-based systems in the real world. 
VI. FUTURE WORK 
Arguably the most important piece of work to conduct in the 
future is to make this proposed network live. This will then let 
us examine in greater detail whether the assumptions in this 
paper hold true against a real world adversary, who controls 
various percentages of the network. 
The deployment onto a real world network would also allow 
us to see whether our solutions to known issues and limitations 
hold true, or if new issues surface. It would also allow more 
research into possible attack vectors, such as an offline chain 
attack, and the effect that this would have on the integrity of the 
data, as well as possible ways to prevent this attack. 
Finally, another key research area is implementing this 
network, for example on a distrusted reputation system, to 
accurately model how the roll of the blockchain should be 
performed: i.e. whether a simple time period is sufficient, or if a 
more sophisticated model is required.  
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